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     Abstract 
Despite decades of debate and efforts to improve global labor standards, multiple 
problems still persist. Whether arguing for a more active role for the state, persuading firms to 
adopt codes of conduct, improving monitoring and sanctioning processes or seeking a higher 
degree of commitment between supply chain actors, scholars still lack an adequate explanation 
for why labor problems do not show improvement. Existing theories, while they will help, are not 
sufficient to solve this issue because they are focused on the production side of markets—the 
result both of an intellectual and policy bias towards production and the tendency to look for 
solutions where problems occur.  Using a case study of Hewlett-Packard’s (HP) supply chain, 
qualitative and quantitative data from field visits to plants in South East Asia and a unique dataset 
of HP’s code of conduct audits, we demonstrate that even under the most-likely conditions that 
favor previous theories of labor standards, code of conduct violations, in particular excess 
working hours, exhibit widespread persistence. Having explained this, we demonstrate that this 
persistence is the product of a set of policies and practices designed and implemented upstream 
by global buyers and their lead suppliers 
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Introduction 
Notwithstanding years of debate and controversy, and numerous interventions by 
national regulatory authorities, global brands, and transnational non-governmental 
organizations to improve labor standards in factories linked to global supply chains, poor 
working conditions, excessive work hours, precarious employment practices, and low 
wages persist. Numerous scholars claim that this persistence is due to inadequate 
government regulation or ineffective (poorly-designed) private compliance systems. As a 
result, they argue for either the revitalization of state regulatory agencies and 
enforcement capacities (Piore and Schrank 2008; Seidman 2007) or for improved private 
monitoring and capability-building initiatives aimed at coaxing firms to address these 
labor problems (Locke, Amengual, and Mangla 2009; O’Rourke 2003; Weil 2004). More 
recently, these debates have yielded a hybrid solution where public and private efforts 
can complement each other leading to better outcomes and new forms of supply chain 
governance (Locke, Rissing, and Pal 2013). Scholars also argue, however, that this 
layering of public and private efforts, whether intentional or not, can lead to a ‘puzzle of 
rules’ that weakens enforcement and commitment (Bartley 2011; Bartley et al. 2015). 
This article argues that these interventions -- no matter how well intentioned and 
designed and regardless of whether they originate from private actors, public authorities, 
or both--are insufficient. This is because they focus solely (or primarily) on the locus of 
production, on the factories producing for global buyers. Although this focus on the 
workplace makes sense, given that this is where most labor standards violations are 
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manifest, the reality is that many of the workplace problems we observe in global supply 
chains are, in fact, the product of a set of policies and practices designed and 
implemented upstream by global buyers and their lead suppliers. In other words, in a 
business environment characterized by dynamic consumer demand, shorter product life 
cycles, and concentrated retail channels, global brands have reorganized their supply 
chains in order to optimize efficiencies and minimize financial and reputational risks. 
Timely delivery of the latest products to the market is essential for global brands 
competing in these dynamic markets. Labor costs, although important, are often a second 
order consideration (Jack and Raturi 2002; Minnich and Maier 2007).  
As a result, global brands and their lead suppliers have developed production 
planning and manufacturing systems that minimize the risks of not meeting consumer 
demand in a timely manner. Although these techniques allow for a broader selection of 
products, faster product introductions, and reduced inventory of poor-selling products for 
both brands and large retailers, they also generate various labor problems downstream for 
factories and their workers. The production architecture necessary to operate this more 
“lean” system is designed to exhibit very high volatility at the point where products are 
assembled. As a result, order volatility is met through a Taylorist work organization, 
where products are assembled by hand, enabling the rapid scaling up and down of 
production. Such a system requires a very flexible labor supply, often in the form of 
migrant workers who work long hours at low wages; a situation that chronically leads to 
persistent labor standards violations, in particular excessive working hours that can run 
up to 72 or 84 hours per week.  
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The findings presented in this article have implications for our understanding of 
how best to address labor standards issues, especially in industries with short product life 
cycles, volatile consumer demand and increasing brand concentration. Yet to date there 
has been very little attention paid to the “upstream” sources of poor working conditions 
in global supply chains. This is due primarily to the way most labor scholars study and 
understand these issues. On the one hand, we focus on the workplaces and factories 
because this is, in fact, where workers are employed and where we observe the vast 
majority of the violations in labor standards and worker rights. On the other hand, we 
“look under the lamppost” because of our own intellectual traditions and biases towards 
production (where people make things) as opposed to how these products are designed, 
sold and consumed.  
Yet shifting patterns of consumption are provoking significant changes in supply 
chain governance, manufacturing practice, and ultimately, employment conditions for the 
millions of workers who make the goods each of us consume every day. Some scholars 
have explored the impact of ethical consumption and various certification schemes on 
consumer behavior (Bartley et al. 2015; Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Sequeira 2011)  and 
others have analyzed the politics underlying consumer credit and consumer protection in 
various advanced industrial nations (Trumbull 2011; Trumbull 2006).  However, there 
has been very little systematic examination of how the management practices global 
brands and large retainers promote in response to upstream industry-level dynamics 
impact working conditions downstream in the factories making their products. This is the 
focus of this article. 
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 Our research is situated in the global electronics industry, a setting where one might 
expect higher degrees of compliance with labor standards and hence, improved working 
conditions. The suppliers operating in this industry are for the most part themselves large 
multinational corporations. Unlike all but the largest suppliers in lower technology 
sectors such as apparel and footwear, many firms in the electronics industry have 
significant capital resources and operational capabilities. Benefiting from access to both 
local and global capital markets, electronics brands and suppliers, as seen in Table 1, 
have built sizable operations with revenue regularly exceeding $1 billion and the largest 
having revenue in excess of $10 billion or more. They are not the typical supplier one 
imagines existing in the apparel or toy industries of the global South.  
 
   ----Insert Table 1 about here--------- 
 
Improving Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains 
The current era of globalization is characterized by fragmented ownership and the 
geographic dispersion of production. This economic transformation poses a set of 
opportunities and challenges for emerging economies. Involvement in global supply 
chains may generate new work opportunities, technological spillover, or higher wages for 
local firms and their workers. Yet integration into global production networks can also 
create a series of labor issues (e.g., poor working conditions, excessive working hours, 
etc.) at these workplaces. Given the competitive pressures, power asymmetries between 
buyers and suppliers (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005), and a worldwide decline 
in workplace legal protections (Standing 2007) it is unsurprising that multiple sources 
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have documented harsh working conditions in an array of global supply chain factories 
(Connor and Dent 2006; Good Electronics 2009; Pruett 2005; SwedWatch, SACOM, and 
SOMO 2008; Verite 2004).  
Historically, two distinct accounts seek to explain the persistence of poor working 
conditions and weak labor standards in global supply chains.  Both views believe that 
these persistent issues cannot be resolved solely by traditional private compliance 
programs. Where they differ is their focus on what specifically needs to be done to 
complement these private voluntary initiatives. One view claims that persistent labor 
violations are the result of inadequate government regulation and thus argues for 
increased state monitoring and enforcement of labor conditions in factories operating 
within their national boundaries (Piore and Schrank 2008; Schrank 2006; Seidman 2007; 
Weil 2004). The second view, while acknowledging the importance of state regulation, 
also recognizes the continuing difficulties most developing countries face in building up 
these institutional capacities (Fung et al. 2001; Nadvi and Waltring 2004).  Private 
voluntary regulation, in fact, emerged to fill the regulatory void created by weak or 
absent government enforcement of national labor laws. According to this second view, 
the persistence of poor working conditions in global supply chain factories stems from 
various design and implementation weaknesses in these still necessary (albeit 
insufficient) private monitoring programs. To remedy these weaknesses, various scholars 
have proposed that private compliance programs become more transparent (Fung, 
O’Rourke, Sabel 2001) and/or better coordinated among firms in the same industry 
(Nadvi and Waltring 2004; O’Rourke 2003), and/or focused on providing suppliers with 
the capabilities (technical know-how, management systems) needed to run more efficient 
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and ethical businesses (Amengual 2014; Locke, Amengual, and Mangla 2009; Locke and 
Romis 2007).  
Previous work on private regulation has examined codes of conduct within athletic 
footwear (Rosenzweig 1994; Strasser and Becklund 1993), apparel (Rodriguez-Garavito 
2005; Weil 2004; Locke, Amengual, and Mangla 2009), and agriculture (Coslovsky and 
Locke 2013; Riisgaard 2009). These studies of low-technology industries have observed 
generally poor compliance with international labor and environmental standards and at 
best modest improvements as a result of private regulatory efforts.  
While more recent work has begun to examine the relationship between production 
systems, capability-building, upgrading and social performance in the apparel industry, 
the results have also been mixed. Nike has made significant investments in moving long-
term suppliers to lean methodologies. While this effort was designed to strengthen 
management processes and systems, it has also improved labor relations resulting in a 
higher likelihood of meeting code of conduct compliance (Distelhorst, Hainmueller, and 
Locke 2016). However, in another study focused on Moroccan fast-fashion suppliers, 
high levels of worker turnover were linked to the introduction of these new management 
systems (Rossi 2013).  In fact, Rossi found that this particular capability-building 
intervention helped a core group of employees while simultaneously making employment 
more precarious for other workers. .  
In addition, given the nature of the work being done in global supply chains, scholars 
have more recently examined whether private systems of regulation can act in isolation, 
suggesting that a mixture of private and public efforts are necessary to improve outcomes 
(Amengual 2010; Locke, Qin, and Brause 2007). Private programs are often layered on 
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top of public ones, with the result that the two may either complement or alternatively, 
undermine one another (Bartley 2011; Locke, Rissing, and Pal 2013).   
 
Labor Standards in the Electronics Industry 
 Is the global electronics industry different? Electronics suppliers’ scale, 
sophistication and market position should create new dynamics of interaction with global 
buyers (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005). Yet notwithstanding the huge volume of 
contract manufacturing business, profits remain highly concentrated among the lead firms 
involved in product definition, marketing, and retail. Fluctuating market demand and 
shorter product life cycles have produced a volatile manufacturing environment within 
the electronics sector. Advances in technology have led to the rapid obsolescence of 
consumer electronics products. In response to variable demand and intense cost 
pressures, contract manufactures have adopted flexible employment policies.  These work 
relationships are characterized by long work hours, precarious or temporary work, and 
high concentrations of women and migrant employees.  
 Contract manufacturers employ significant numbers of contingent or agency 
workers in order to limit worker benefit coverage and enable suppliers to hire and fire 
employees rapidly in response to variations in production demand.  Many of the migrant 
workers are also subject to high recruitment fees that they pay to labor agencies that 
match them with these temporary jobs (CAFOD 2004; Chan and Peyer 2008; Smith, 
Sonnenfeld, and Fellow 2006). A representative from the electronics supplier Foxconn 
went as far to say “[Foxconn] believes that it would be better to hire all workers directly; 
unfortunately our variable manufacturing volumes do not allow us to do it”(Centre for 
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Reflection and Action on Labour Issues (CEREAL) 2007).  This combination of low-
skilled assembly work by large numbers of contingent and/or migrant workers has led to 
labor rights issues surrounding working hours, benefits, and safety (Duhigg and Bradsher 
2012; Kiss 2012; Good Electronics 2009; Smith, Sonnenfeld, and Fellow 2006).  
 The harsh working conditions in the industry were most vividly manifest by the 
tragic worker suicides within Chinese electronics facilities owned by Foxconn (Dean and 
Tsai 2010).  These suicides rallied coalitions of investors (Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility 2010) and NGOs to condemn abusive workplace conditions in the industry 
and call for stricter oversight. While the problems in the electronics industry’s supply 
chain are now well-known, only recently have efforts to remediate these issues emerged 
(Distelhorst et. al. 2015; Locke, Rissing, and Pal 2013; Nadvi and Raj-Reichert 2015.  
 Given the differential nature—scale, scope and resources--of electronics brands 
and suppliers, why do we see suppliers with billions of dollars in revenue and hundreds 
of millions in capital repeatedly violate labor standards? What role, if any, do industry 
dynamics play in setting working conditions? Are some problems, such as excess 
working hours, a necessary condition for these types of large, highly-dynamic supply 
chains?  This article argues that although more effective regulation and better-designed 
private compliance systems would certainly help improve labor standards in these global 
supply chains, they are not in and of themselves sufficient to tackle these persistent 
workplace issues.  
Although the alternative explanations reviewed above may help explain (and 
provide guidance for improving) working conditions and labor standards in certain 
sectors and/or nation-states, they appear unable (in and of themselves) to explain why we 
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see persistent working hours violations in numerous electronics factories. There must be 
other forces at work. We argue that the policies and practices implemented upstream in 
response to highly dynamic consumer and retail markets shape supply chain practices, 
production architectures, and work organization downstream in the factories 
manufacturing these goods. Labor standards problems, exemplified by excessive working 
hours, are not only (or even primarily) the result of poor managerial practices and 
behavior in the plants, but rather stem from the series of supply-chain responses to these 
dynamic market conditions that have become routinized and optimized by global buyers 
in an effort to mitigate their financial and reputation risks and meet demand for their 
products in a timely manner.  
In seeking to minimize uncertainty, firms routinely utilize product design, 
demand-signaling and production-planning practices that mandate modularity of design 
and assembly allowing for the building of buffer inventories of lower-cost standardized 
intermediates while postponing the final assembly of differentiated and much costlier 
finished goods. Although these practices mitigate risk by producing only those goods 
demanded by consumers, they create labor problems by structurally constraining the 
supply chain’s downstream production architecture and corresponding design of work 
organization. In what follows we describe in detail the evolution of these upstream 
business practices and their consequences for work organization and working conditions 
in the factories. We finish by suggesting an alternative, complementary approach to 
addressing them.  
 
Data and Methods 
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This article draws upon both a unique dataset of Electronic Industry Citizenship 
Coalition (EICC) supplier audits that Hewlett-Packard (HP) selectively administered to 
its network of global suppliers, as well as field interviews with HP suppliers and staff in 
the United States and Southeast Asia in 2009. Hewlett Packard (HP) is one of the world's 
largest global electronics firms.i In the fiscal year 2010, when we conducted our research 
for this study, HP shipped over sixty-four million personal computers (PCs) for a global 
market share of 20%.ii It directly employed over 325,000 people across 170 countries and 
contracted with approximately 1,000 production suppliers in 1,200 locations worldwide 
(Hewlett Packard 2011). Although it is difficult to estimate the number of workers 
employed in its supply chain, HP reports that the ninety suppliers audited in 2010—less 
than 10% of all of HP’s suppliers—employed over 260,000 workers.  
 
The HP Audits, Pilot Program and Fieldwork 
HP shared over five hundred original audit reports conducted between June 2004 
and January 2009 with us.  This sample describes 276 unique facilities, 137 of which 
received multiple audits. These audits assessed supplier compliance with the Electronics 
Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) code of conduct, and were conducted by HP 
employees explicitly trained to evaluate suppliers’ compliance with the EICC code. 
Audits were performed onsite at supplier facilities and a subsection of audit reports were 
verified by an external organization to ensure the accuracy of assessments and to enable 
improvements. Of the 276 facilities in our dataset, only seven complied fully with all 
requirements included in the EICC code of conduct at the time  the HP shared these 
reports with us. In addition, HP initiated a separate pilot program on working hour 
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violations with thirteen plants in China and provided us with monthly detailed reports 
from January 2008 to November 2009. 
This quantitative analysis was complemented by qualitative field research in 
several countries (China, Mexico, Czech Republic, Hungary, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore). For this article, we visited seven HP first-tier facilities in Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand in June 2009, conducting 27 interviews with plant managers, 
human resources managers, production managers, supplier’s corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) managers, regional HP auditors, corporate officers and labor non-
governmental organization (NGO) representatives. All plant interviews were conducted 
in the absence of HP personnel and lasted between one and three hours. Some plant visits 
also yielded detailed quantitative data on production, employment, and purchasing 
practices. Facilities were selected for variation in audit outcomes, product mix, demand 
volatility, work organization and the institutional setting of the plant’s location. Finally, 
we drew on published papers by members of HP’s production planning group. 
 
HP as Critical Case: Benefits and Limitations 
Given its history, position in the industry, capital resources and well-known 
commitment to social responsibility, we consider Hewlett-Packard to be a most-likely 
case (Goldthorpe et al. 1969): if any company can improve labor standards along its 
supply chain, Hewlett-Packard should be able to do so. HP is well known for the ‘HP 
Way’ and its commitment to social responsibility (Collins and Packard 2005). It was 
instrumental in the setting up of the industry’s code of conduct and it was HP’s own 
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employees that pointed out the first labor problems in the industry when HP outsourced 
its ink-jet production to Asian suppliers from its plants in Vancouver, Washington. 
While the use of a single case has a number of limitations, especially concerning 
the generalizability of our findings, the HP data yields significant within-case variation, 
including supplier, country location, demand volatility, product scope (mix) and scale 
(volume). This variation helps us to control for a number of key factors: national 
institutions--as reflected in regulatory response to labor law violations; brand-supplier 
contracting—as reflected in the nature of production within individual plants; and 
supplier capabilities and resources—as reflected in the work organization and capital 
assets employed. It also provides us with analytical leverage to understand the role 
industry dynamics may have beyond any individual firm.  
The use of HP as a single-case will not allow us to observe other electronics 
firms’ compliance programs. This may give rise to the possibility that our findings are 
HP specific and thus not generalizable. Given, however, the electronics industry’s 
adoption of the EICC code of conduct as a means to eliminate duplicate audits and 
related ‘audit fatigue’ and that almost all electronics firms use the EICC, code and audit 
protocol, we believe this risk is relatively low. We further believe that the repeated labor 
problems in electronics factories, reported by scholars, civil society and the media, are 
further indication that compliance is extremely difficult for all firms and that our findings 
can help shed light on why this is the case.  
Finally, although interviews with HP auditors and CSR managers revealed that 
HP does periodically terminate relationships with suppliers that repeatedly violate their 
code of conduct, we did not have access to HP purchasing managers who could verify 
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what threshold had to be passed for supplier termination. One limit of our research and 
almost all work that examines labor standards in large global corporations is that CSR 
managers and more operational/financial managers operate in siloes, often not 
coordinating their actions within the firm, let alone to their suppliers.. HP’s auditors have 
a fair amount of discretion but ultimately purchasing decisions are made by the 
purchasing team and were thus unobserved by us.  
 
Structure of EICC Audits 
In response to poor labor and environmental conditions in the electronics industry, 
Hewlett Packard (HP) and other lead firms launched corporate social and environmental 
responsibility (SER) programs in the late 1990s.  Moreover, prominent lead firms such as 
HP, Dell, and IBM were able to initiate a collaborative approach to monitoring supplier 
conduct through the establishment in 2004 of the Electronics Industry Citizenship 
Coalition and its code of conduct. Although the code was initially implemented more or 
less independently by each member of the EICC, member companies have made 
significant progress over time to coordinate these efforts by moving towards a common 
pool of auditors and sharing audit results in an effort to reduce audit fatigue among 
suppliers and eliminate conflicting standards, two issues that often hamper private 
monitoring efforts (Locke, Qin, and Brause 2007; Nadvi and Waltring 2004; O’Rourke 
2003). 
The EICC code is divided into seven sections: the first covers broad code of 
conduct compliance issues, and is followed by six more specific sections addressing 
issues related to labor, health, environment, labor management, environmental health and 
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safety management, and ethics.  Each of these sections contains between three and eleven 
subsections that are assessed for compliance outcomes.  If a problematic area is observed 
it can be flagged as an “observation,” “minor violation,” or “major violation” depending 
on the severity of the issue.  A “major” violation (also referred to as nonconformance) 
refers to the inability of a supplier’s management system to comply with a core EICC 
standard.  Select major non-conformances can also be denoted as zero tolerance items.  
Such issues include the utilization of underage child workers, forced labor, health and 
safety issues posing immediate danger or serious injury, and violation of environmental 
laws posing serious and immediate harm to the community.  “Minor” violations refer to 
more isolated findings. A temporarily blocked emergency exit or missing safety 
equipment would be examples of such “minor” violations. Finally, “observations” are 
generally a recognition that a superior means of documenting or monitoring a process or 
procedure may exist.  Audit items flagged as observations are not considered to be 
violations of the code of conduct.   
 
Audit Results 
Notwithstanding significant efforts by both HP and the EICC, an analysis of the 
audit reports reveals persistent problems. As seen in Figure 1, the top seven major code 
violations comprise three labor-related violations and four environmental, safety and 
health violations. Nearly 60% of audited facilities, including those with follow-up or 
more frequent audits, had routine workweeks longer than 60 hours per week. 40% of 
audited plants, including those subjected to follow-up and repeated audits, had no or poor 
emergency planning, training and evacuation procedures. Finally, 32.5% of audited firms 
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had some troubles with their management of hazardous materials, and 30.2 % had 
problems with wages and benefits, indicating that wages may not have met local 
minimums and/or failed to include a premium for overtime work. 
 
--------- Insert Figure 1 about here -------------- 
 
When the top four violations are examined by the number of audits conducted at 
particular plants, whether as follow-up audits or part of a periodic audit process, a clearer 
picture of persistent trends emerges. Analyzing audit data by number of audits helps 
explore possible mechanisms that might lead to improvements in audit results, (i.e., 
increased compliance through more frequent inspections and policing; better working 
conditions through a plant’s enhanced capabilities and management systems). In all 
cases, we would expect plants to exhibit improvements in their standards as a result of 
more frequent and numerous factory audits. 
 
----------- Insert Figure 2 about here ---------------- 
 
However, as seen in Figure 2, while the rate of failed audits in three areas 
(emergency preparedness, hazardous materials, and wages and benefits) decreased or 
remained stable between 2004 and 2008, working hour violations occurred at nearly 
twice the rate as the next most common violation, emergency preparedness  (67% vs. 
35%). In short, even with frequent and repeated audits, close to 70% of HPs suppliers had 
employees working more than sixty hours per week. Why do working hour violations 
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increase even under additional scrutiny and why are they so pervasive? NGO’s frequently 
cite working hour violations as the most highly-significant, recurring problem in these 
supply chain factories (Good Electronics 2009; Level Works 2006; Verite 2004) 
confirming what we find in the HP audit data. Likewise, an extraordinary 90% of EICC 
members admitted that excessive working hours is an ongoing challenge for them (EICC 
2009a). This concern is particularly noteworthy given that the working hours stipulation 
is the only EICC code item (out of 37 items) that specifically defines the standard:  “[…] 
a workweek should not be more than 60 hours per week, including overtime, except in 
emergency or unusual situations” (EICC 2009b, 2). 
 
------------Insert Figure 3 about here -------------- 
 
As seen in Figure 3, an examination of working hour violations by region reveals 
the most frequent violations, more than 83%, occur in Chinese plants. This is consistent 
with the literature on Chinese labor issues (Ngai 2005). Plants in Asia-Pacific, primarily 
Southeast Asia, violate working hours on 34% of audits. Together these two regions 
constitute 75% of HP’s total purchases from its external suppliers. In the Asia-Pacific 
region where purchasing is concentrated, we find violations do not vary significantly in 
the countries with the largest number of audits conducted: Malaysia, Singapore & 
Thailand (36-45% of audits contain violations) notwithstanding their distinct economic 
profiles and institutional arrangements. 3 
                                               3	An examination of the audit documents of Malaysian companies revealed that labor violations in 
Malaysia were underreported. This is due to the auditors’ belief that the Malaysian national labor law 
(which allows 72 hours per week) took precedent over the EICC. The EICC states that working hours shall 
not exceed 60 hours per week, independent of national laws.  
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Further highlighting the problems of excessive working hours are data from HP’s 
pilot program of thirteen plants in China, as seen in Figure 4. In January 2008, at the 
beginning of the HP pilot, 55% of the workers employed at the thirteen plants 
participating in the pilot study worked more than the EICC maximum of 60 hours per 
week. By December 2008, as seasonal demand and orders for new products wound down, 
only 13% of these workers were working more than the established limit.. However, in 
February 2009, 50% of the employees at the pilot study plants were once again working 
beyond the set limit of 60 hours per week, and by the summer of 2009, as new product 
ramp-up accelerated, over 70% of employees at the thirteen plants were working above 
the EICC limit.  
 
--------- Insert Figure 4 about here ------------ 
 
Interestingly enough, code violations regarding excessive working hours occurred not 
just in low-wage China, a setting often depicted as not possessing a strong commitment 
to enforcing labor regulations, but also in Singapore, a high-wage economy characterized 
by strong institutions, well-trained managers, and more stringent regulatory enforcement.  
 
 
How Management Policies and Practices Impact Labor Conditions on the Factory Floor 
To better understand these patterns of persistent labor standard violations among 
HP’s suppliers,, we visited seven first-tier supplier plants across southeast Asia. We were 
particularly interested in how work was organized and whether such work organization 
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influenced outcomes. As seen in Table 2, we purposely chose plants that varied across a 
number of dimensions. Activities varied from intermediate component manufacture to 
final assembly: injection molding and hard-disk drive manufacture to wet-cartridge filling 
and final assembly of ink jet printers. All plants were subsidiaries of publicly traded firms 
with significant financial resources. Some plants were owned by companies that were 
affiliated with the EICC, while others were not. Plant output varied from very high (over 
90 million units annually) to low (under 2 million units annually). Generally, the higher 
the annual volume, the lower the mix (variety) of products manufactured in the plant.  
Four plants (two in Singapore and two in Thailand) had working hour violations 
in 2007. Three of these plants were re-audited in 2008 and one again failed to pass the 
audit. Closer plant-level analysis reveals that all of these violations occurred in plants 
with high unit volumes and relatively low product mix, plants that leverage economies of 
scale rather than of scope. For the two plants that passed the second audit, this outcome 
may have resulted from fortuitous timing rather than actual changes in the nature or 
organization of work at the two establishments. According to the plant manager, Epsilon, 
an HDD plant in Thailand, was in the process of being sold to another company and thus 
a significant amount of work had been transferred internally to another company 
location4. The second plant, Kappa, an injection-molder in Singapore, had also moved a 
significant amount of work to a new plant in Malaysia5. Thus, work hour violations may 
have decreased not because of changes to management and work practices but simply 
because a significant amount of work had moved elsewhere. Most importantly, Upsilon, 
                                               4	Interview, plant manager, Hard Drive Plant, Thailand 6/17/09 5	Interview, senior manager. Injection Moulding Plant, Singapore 6/19/09	
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an ink-jet final assembly plant in Malaysia that chronically violated working hour 
standards, “passed” the EICC audit because the auditor mistakenly applied Malaysian law 
which at the time of our research allowed for approximately 74 hours of work per week6. 
Interviews with managers in five of these seven plants revealed that they believed 
managing working hour requirements was the most significant challenge they faced. A 
senior production manager in a hard-disk drive plant in Thailand stated that they had to 
accommodate a monthly swing in production from 3.8 million units down to 1.3 million 
and then back up to 2 million. The only way they could do this was by insisting that  
operators work seven days per week7. Consistent with this manager’s comments, we 
found all seven plants employ large numbers of agency or contract workers to help 
smooth production. These workers, who are overwhelmingly migrants, routinely 
exceeded 60% of a plant’s total workforce. 
 
 
--------- Insert Table 2 ------------------ 
 
 
All plants visited for this study use manual labor for final assembly of modules 
and products, with six out of the seven employing conveyor assembly lines8. The six 
plants with conveyor assembly lines operate with two 12-hour shifts, five to seven days a 
                                               6	Malaysian law allowed for 48 hours of straight time per week and 104 hours of overtime per month.	The 
EICC allows for only a total 60 hours per week including overtime.	Interview-HR manager, Ink-Jet 
Assembly Plant, Malaysia 6/24/09 7	Interview, senior manager—Hard Disk Drive Plant, Thailand 6/17/09	8	In conveyor or linear assembly, the positions of operators are fixed and assembly occurs in a sequential 
manner as product travels past these operators on a conveying system.	
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week, depending upon orders. Managers at all the plants visited in this study claimed that 
it was often impossible to fulfill orders and meet production schedules by working only 
five days per week. Each assembly station involved work tasks of between 20 and 30 
seconds. Depending upon the sophistication of the product being assembled, assembly 
lines could grow from 80 to 220 operators, each performing a very narrow task. 
Managers at all of these plants were well aware of alternative (cell) assembly options and 
one plant ran both forms of work organization whenever possible. However, 95% of 
employees worked on conveyor assembly lines.  Given the reliance on manual labor, one 
production manager commented that it was difficult to find productivity improvements 
short of completely automating a line and then that line may not run when volume 
dropped9. 
Plant managers claim that they opt for this more Taylorist form of work 
organization because it permits very short training periods for new operators. These 
managers indicated that this form of work organization was independent of any specific 
brand or global lead firm they work with. Managers in almost every plant visited for this 
study reported that the vast majority of engineers in their plants were process engineers, 
focused on assembly line efficiencies10. Employee turnover at these plants was high and 
mobility between factories was facilitated by the common work organization of conveyor 
assembly across all plants, independent of ownership.  
                                               9	Interview—production manager, HDD plant, Thailand, 6/17/09 10	Interviews with senior managers, DC Converters, HDD plants—Thailand 6/15-19/09, Ink Jet Filling—
Singapore 6/22-23/09, Printer Assembly—Malaysia 6/24/09 
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Most operators on the assembly lines were female migrant workers11 hired on 
two-year contracts. Most migrant workers sought to maximize their earnings by working 
overtime whenever possible. Overtime hours were earned after an aggregate total number 
of hours was achieved12, allowing workers to double their wages by working weekends. 
Because production orders are highly volatile, factories broke their labor contracts with 
these migrant workers on a regular basis (Good Electronics 2009). The conveyor 
assembly operations they used allow for both the quick absorption of new workers as 
well as the ability to rapidly shed these workers when demand suddenly drops.   
 
Explaining Persistent Working Hours Violations: The Cascading Effect of 
Upstream Business Practices on Labor Standards in the Global Electronics Industry 
 
The Starting Point: Increasing Industry Dependence on Consumer Markets  
 Since the advent of the personal computer, the electronics industry has evolved 
from being primarily a supplier to governments and large commercial organizations to 
one whose growth opportunities now originate in consumer markets. Consumer markets 
are continually subject to cost and product innovation, motivating firms to advance the 
technological frontier. Increasing consumer technology-adoption rates have also 
shortened product life cycles.  
 In order to maximize market share over such short life cycles, retailers engage in 
constant promotions that rapidly erode selling prices. Given an average product life cycle 
of 8 months, prices may drop as often as every two months. This price erosion, along 
                                               11	Migrant workers in China and Thailand are in-country, while workers in Malaysia and Singapore are 
foreign. 12	By contrast, this policy	differs from those common in advanced industrialized countries where overtime 
can be achieved by working more than 8 hours any day, independent of aggregate hours.	
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with the need to carry a broad product assortment, limits retailer appetite for large 
inventories. Instead retailers opt for more frequent shipments, often by air cargo, to meet 
consumer demand (Leinbach and Bowen 2004).  
 This balancing act is complicated by the concentration of electronics retail channels 
that has occurred in recent years. As seen in Figure 5, the top four competitors in the US 
consumer electronics and computer retail distribution channels control close to 75% of 
their respective markets. Oligopsonistic buying power allows retailers to maintain 
margins, thus forcing price drops on the brands as the electronics firms move products 
through their life cycles. Retailers also seek to differentiate product from their 
competitors in order to prevent consumers from price-shopping products, a process easily 
facilitated by the Internet.  
 
   --------Insert Figure 5 about here-------- 
 
 
 As a result, brands often make small functionality changes to products to disguise 
any potential similarity between rival products. Short product life cycles and the need for 
thinly differentiated products lead to a constant parade of new product introductions 
punctuated by rapid phase-outs. For example, in 2009 Hewlett-Packard maintained over 
2,000 laser printer product types, more than 15,000 server and storage product types and 
over eight million possible configure-to-order combinations in its notebook and desktop 
product lines (Ward et al. 2010).  
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How the Electronics Industry Responds to Dynamic Consumer and Retail Markets  
 The result of these various practices creates great uncertainty within the industry. 
Buffeted by rapidly changing technology, volatile consumer demand, and powerful retail 
customers, brands are obligated to optimize supply chain management practices to remain 
competitive. For example, Kaipia et al looked at the demand and production volatility of 
a major European electronics manufacturer (Kaipia, Korhonen, and Hartiala 2006). Even 
with a relatively linear demand, volatility is extreme at the contract manufacturer level 
with production changes of 80% on a week-by-week basis.  
 The electronics industry has sought to manage these supply chain challenges 
through three broad strategic responses: modular product design, production of buffer 
inventories of intermediates, and postponement of final assembly until signaled by pull-
based ordering systems. Products are designed with standardized, substitutable 
components that can also be assembled when necessary into common modules. These 
modules and components, known as intermediates because of their unfinished state, have 
separate production schedules, allowing for the buildup of buffer inventories that can be 
easily reallocated among different products at final assembly, depending upon consumer 
demand. Finally, assembly of finished goods is postponed until accurate demand signals 
are available. This triggering of orders is known as pull-based ordering due to the 
dependence on consumer demand (as evidenced by retail point of sales data) for releasing 
orders into a production system rather than production minimums, as was done during the 
era of Fordist mass-production. Final products have a significantly higher cost than just 
the sum of their parts because of the threat of rapid obsolescence. This system works 
because postponement reduces the financial and reputational risks of unsold finished 
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goods inventory. 
 In order to attenuate volatility during the production of intermediates and encourage 
the buildup of component inventory, brands choose to take the financial risk of 
maintaining ownership of and selling components to assemblers on an as needed basis. In 
a series of articles, scholars working with HP planners laid out the basis for this practice, 
referred to as “price-masking”. Originally conceived as an exercise in bargaining power, 
the practice has become widespread over time (Ellram and Billington 2001). 
 On the production side, contract manufacturers are reluctant to absorb inventory 
risk, unless they have the opportunity to markup components as well as assembly 
services. Brands, operating under the premise that they only pay for value-add, will not 
agree to these markups. Instead, they negotiate component pricing directly with the 
component producer. This policy minimizes inventory risk to the assembler, while 
allowing the brand to spread its own risk among a portfolio of products. By design, price 
masking encourages the buildup of buffer inventories at the intermediate stage under the 
assumption that the financial risk of substitutable components is substantially less than 
that of finished goods that cannot be reworked.  
 A byproduct of pull-based systems is that demand volatility is magnified at the final 
point of assembly. Because brands want to avoid inventory of finished goods and thus 
postpone final assembly of their products for as long as possible, production volumes 
exhibit periodic spikes of 300-500% over baseline levels. This volatility can be further 
amplified by the timing of frequent new product introductions that require large ramp-
ups. The need to plan for this volatility is well known to brands and suppliers and is 
regularly optimized. HP even publishes demand volatility forecasts and operational 
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mitigation techniques in technology operations journals (Burruss and Kuettner 2002).  
 
The Case of Inkjet Printers 
 Among the seven plants visited, the Upsilon plant in Malaysia is perhaps the best 
exemplar of the tensions inherent in manufacturing products for volatile demand markets. 
It is also the one plant that allowed us to match employee counts with production 
quantities to better understand the demand uncertainty that is pushed down to suppliers13. 
Upsilon is a vertically integrated producer of inkjet printers that at its historic peak in 
2007 produced one million units per month for HP. The plant exhibited the most extreme 
case of demand volatility among the seven plants visited for this study. It also had a 
highly developed management program and internal job ladder (for a small group of core 
workers).  
At the time of our research, the plant produced six to eight models per year with 
an average product life of less than nine months. As seen in Figure 6, monthly volumes 
could increase by up to 250%. Employment levels could also swing (up and down) by 
58%. 
 
 
-------- Insert Figure 6 about here ----------------- 
 
To manage its highly volatile production schedules, the Upsilon plant regularly hired 
60% of its workforce through Malaysian government-certified contract agencies. These 
                                               13	Interviews with senior plant managers and production supervisors—Ink-Jet Final Assembly, Malaysia 
6/24/09 
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agencies recruited Bangladeshi and Nepalese workers who signed two-year contracts 
with the agency and started work usually in June, in time for the seasonal product ramp-
up. Notwithstanding their two-year employment contract, the plant regularly laid off the 
vast majority of these workers six months later, due to decreased production orders. 
Malaysian laws allows for these contracts to be broken as long as workers receive a 
payment of one month’s base wage as severance. Thus, while this process of hiring and 
firing migrant workers on a regular basis is not a technical violation of the EICC code of 
conduct, this practice certainly violates the spirit of the code.  
Interestingly enough, our interviews at this plant revealed that management tried 
to be good employers. Both the production facilities and the dormitories housing the 
migrant workers were modern and in good shape. The plant promoted an extensive 
Kaizen program. Production supervisors, whenever possible, promoted cell assembly, 
though this is most often limited to low-volume, high-mix production (less than 5% of 
total production). The issue at this plant was not one of managerial bad will or inadequate 
management systems but rather of how various upstream business practices constrain 
production and work organization practices on the shop floor. Given the highly volatile 
production orders they received, plant managers at Upsilon believed that there was no 
other way they could profitably run their operations.  
.  
  
Concluding Considerations: Volatility, Production Practices and Labor Standards   
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 Volatility and its disruptive effects on manufacturing practices and employment 
relations is not new but rather has a long history in an array of different industries.14 But 
the way that it is being “managed” in today’s electronics industry seems to create serious 
problems for workers. Manufacturing practices in the electronics industry appears to be 
an odd amalgam of both “lean” and more traditional Taylorist work practices. On the one 
hand, the industry is characterized by a variety of practices – pull-based ordering, 
modular design and assembly, price masking, postponement of final assembly – that all 
appear to enhance efficiencies and mitigate risks for both global brands and their lead 
suppliers.   
On the other hand, these “lean” practices are complemented by an organization of 
production and work, especially in plants with high volume, low variety production 
schedules, that appears to be as Taylorist as factories of a by-gone era (McKay 2006; 
Smith, Sonnenfeld, and Fellow 2006). Pull-based ordering coupled with postponement of 
final assembly requires that plants have the ability to scale up and down quickly. 
Automation, while conceptually a possible solution to this volatility, runs the same risk 
that an earlier era of mass-producers faced: under-utilization of capital-intensive 
equipment.  
 Instead, contract manufacturers employ large-scale hand-assembly coupled with 
lean manufacturing techniques. Operators work on products in a sequential manner with 
each operation taking 20-30 seconds. Production lines can be added or dropped quickly to 
meet demand. In this manner, demand/production order volatility is met primarily 
                                               14	See (Piore and Sabel 1984) for an historical overview for how both mass production and flexibly 
specialized firms responded to previous shifts in demand conditions. See (Katz and Sabel 1985) for how 
volatility was “managed” historically in the US automobile industry. 
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through the flexible use of labor. Intentionally or unintentionally, Taylorist conveyor 
assembly is reinforced by the use of price masking policies. While brands may be 
absorbing contract manufacturers’ inventory risk through this practice, they are also 
taking away opportunities for contract manufacturers to earn additional profit, thus 
forcing them to maximize labor efficiency as the main way they earn profits (Clark, 
Kraemer, and Dedrick 2009). This drive to squeeze as much profit out of the work 
process inevitably leads to an array of different labor standards problems (excessive 
working hours, low wages, over-reliance on contingent migrant workers, etc.). 
 Through a case study of Hewlett-Packard and the global electronics industry, we 
have sought to demonstrate how some persistent labor problems originate in various 
upstream business practices. Some scholars have argued that as industry dynamics 
evolve, the governance systems that shape buyer-supplier relations will also change to 
adapt to more balanced power and/or capabilities between these key players in global 
supply chains (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005). Thus, we might expect that the 
Taylorist work systems and frequent labor problems described in this article to eventually 
disappear as supply chain governance becomes more “relational” as opposed to 
“transactional”. This may be possible but in electronics, where brands may control 80% 
of the margin (Clark, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2009), their suppliers are not small firms but 
rather global multinationals with revenue in the billions and operations spread around the 
world. These contract manufacturers are highly capitalized, publicly-traded firms with 
deep capabilities. But neither they nor the brands they supply appear able to eradicate 
persistent labor problems notwithstanding various compliance and/or capability-building 
efforts.  
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 Others have argued that the only way to enforce labor standards and improve 
working conditions, given the absence of a “market for virtue” (Vogel 2005)– that is a 
business case for resolving these workplace issues – is through greater regulatory 
enforcement by the state (Reich 2007; Seidman 2007). In a companion paper (Distelhorst, 
Locke, Pal and Samel 2015) we too illustrate the importance of strong national 
regulations for enhancing workplace conditions. Yet the Taylorist workplace practices, 
excessive working hours, and extensive use of migrant labor we describe above are 
present in both “strong” and “weak” regulatory environments. Interestingly enough, some 
of these governments (wittingly or unwittingly) have enabled certain exploitative labor 
practices by promoting policies that protect core workers at the expense of migrant 
workers who make up the majority of the labor force in the electronics industry.  
 All of this suggests that if we are serious about improving working conditions and 
promoting labor rights in global supply chains we need to move beyond our traditional 
debates over public vs. private regulation and/or particular models of supply chain 
governance and begin to examine systematically how patterns of consumption impact 
workplace practices in the factories producing the goods most of us purchase every day. 
Currently, discussions of ethical consumption focus primarily on the impact various 
certification schemes may have on the willingness of different types of consumers to pay 
more or buy more of these supposedly ethically sourced products. We believe that these 
discussions need to broaden to include policies aimed at shaping consumption patterns 
that may lead to “fair” prices” for goods produced through “fair” working conditions. In 
the past, such forms of “regulated competition” existed in which rival firms shifted their 
competitive strategies away from cut throat pricing and towards more innovation-based 
  
30 
 
and sustainable production and distribution practices. Private firms still competed fiercely 
with one another but the terms of competition were regulated (mostly, self-regulated by 
the industry associations themselves) in order to protect standards for both firms and their 
workers. (Berk 1996). Given the growing awareness of and concern for more sustainable 
business strategies, and the fact that for many of the actors involved in the electronics 
industry, current practices do not seem to be generating the kinds of high-wage, high-
skill, high-margin opportunities they had hoped for, perhaps we are at a moment when we 
could actually begin such a conversation. Whether or not this is possible in today’s global 
economy, and if so, how to structure it, is beyond the scope of this paper but this broader 
discussion is essential if we are going to promote a more sustainable and just economy. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Amengual, Matthew. 2010. “Complementary Labor Regulation: The Uncoordinated 
Combination of State and Private Regulators in the Dominican Republic.” World 
Development 38 (3): 405–14. 
———. 2014. “Pathways to Enforcement: Labor Inspectors Leveraging Linkages with 
Society in Argentina.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 67 (1). 
http://ilr.sagepub.com/content/67/1/3.short. 
Bartley, T. 2011. “Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of 
Public and Private Standards.” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 12 (2): 1–25. 
Bartley, Tim, Sebastian Koos, Hiram Samel, Gustavo Setrini, and Nik Summers. 2015. 
Looking behind the Label: Global Industries and the Conscientious Consumer. 
Indiana University Press. 
Burruss, Jim, and Dorothea Kuettner. 2002. “Forecasting For Short-Lived Products: 
Hewlett-Packard’s Journey.” Journal of Business Forecasting Methods and 
Systems 21 (4): 9–14. 
CAFOD. 2004. “Clean Up Your Computer: Working Conditions in the Electronics 
Sector.” London: CAFOD. 
Centre for Reflection and Action on Labour Issues (CEREAL). 2007. “Labour Rights in a 
Time of Crisis.” 
Chan, Jenny, and Chantal Peyer. 2008. “High Tech - No Rights? One Year Follow Up 
Report on the Working Conditions in the Electronic Hardware Sector in China.” 
Hong Kong: Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbeavior (SACOM). 
Clark, Gregory, Kenneth L. Kraemer, and Jason Dedrick. 2009. “Who Captures Value in 
a Global Innovation Network? The Case of Apple’s iPod.” Communications of the 
Acm 52 (3): 140–44. 
Collins, Jim, and David Packard. 2005. “Foreword to the HP Way.” In The HP Way, 
edited by David Kirby and Karen Lewis, xi – xviii. New York: Harper Collins. 
Connor, Tim, and Kelly Dent. 2006. “Offside! Labour Rights and Sportswear Production 
in Asia.” Oxfam. http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/offside_labor_report. 
Coslovsky, S., and R Locke. 2013. “Enforcing Labor Standards in the Sugar Supply 
Chain: The Brazilian Experience.” Politics and Society, Vol. 41, No. 4 (December 
2013): 497-526.. 
Distelhorst, Greg, Jens Hainmueller, and Richard M. Locke. 2016. “Does Lean Improve 
Labor Standards? Management and Social Performance in the Nike Supply 
Chain.” Management Science, Vol. 63, No. 3 (March 2016): 707-728.  
Distelhorst, Greg, Richard M. Locke, Timea Pal, and Hiram Samel. 2015. “Production 
Goes Global, Compliance Stays Local: Private Regulation in the Global 
Electronics Industry.” Regulation & Governance 9 (3): 224–42. 
doi:10.1111/rego.12096. 
Duhigg, Charles, and Keith Bradsher. 2012. “Apple, America and a Squeezed Middle 
Class.” The New York Times, January 21, sec. Business Day. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/apple-america-and-a-squeezed-
middle-class.html?hp. 
EICC. 2009a. “Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition: 2008 Annual Report.” 
Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition. 
  
1 
 
———. 2009b. “Electronic Industry Code of Conduct: Version 3.01.” 
Ellram, Lisa, and Corey Billington. 2001. “Purchasing Leverage Considerations in the 
Outsourcing Decision.” European Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management 7 (1): 15–27. 
Fung, Archon, Dara O’Rourke, Charles Sabel, Joshua Cohen, and Rogers. 2001. Can We 
Put an End to Sweatshops? Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press. 
Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey, and Timothy Sturgeon. 2005. “The Governance of Global 
Value Chains.” Review of International Political Economy 12: 78–104. 
Goldthorpe, J. H, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer, and J. Platt. 1969. The Affluent Worker in 
the Class Structure. Cambridge Univ Pr. 
Good Electronics. 2009. “Reset: Corporate Social Responsibility in the Global 
Electronics Supply Chain.” Amsterdam: Good Electronics MVO Platform. 
Hainmueller, Jens, Michael Hiscox, and Sandra Sequeira. 2011. “Consumer Demand for 
the Fair Trade Label: Evidence from a Field Experiment.” SSRN eLibrary. 
http://ssrn.com/paper=1801942. 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility. 2010. “Investor Statement Regarding 
Suicides and Working Conditions at Electronics Manufacturing Facilities.” 
http://www.iccr.org/news/press_releases/072110InvestorStatementonWorkingCon
ditions.pdf. 
Jack, Eric P., and Amitabh Raturi. 2002. “Sources of Volume Flexibility and Their 
Impact on Performance.” Journal of Operations Management 20 (5): 519–48. 
Kaipia, Riikka, Hille Korhonen, and Helena Hartiala. 2006. “Planning Nervousness in a 
Demand Supply Network: An Empirical Study.” International Journal of 
Logistics Management 17 (1): 95–113. 
Katz, Harry, and Charles Sabel. 1985. “Industrial Relations & Industrial Adjustment in 
the Car Industry.” Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 24 (3): 
295–315. 
Kiss, Jemima. 2012. “The Real Price of an iPhone 5: Life in the Foxconn Factory.” The 
Guardian. September 13, 2012. 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/sep/13/cost-iphone-5-foxconn-
factory. 
Leinbach, Thomas R., and John T. Bowen. 2004. “Air Cargo Services and the Electronics 
Industry in Southeast Asia.” Journal of Economic Geography 4 (3): 299–321. 
doi:10.1093/jnlecg/lbh009. 
Level Works. 2006. “Wages, Benefits and Work Hours in the Peoples Reublic of China.” 
San Francisco, CA: Level Works Limited. 
Locke, Richard M., Matthew Amengual, and Akshay Mangla. 2009. “Virtue out of 
Necessity?: Compliance, Commitment and the Improvement of Labor Conditions 
in Global Supply Chains.” Politics & Society 37: 319–51. 
Locke, Richard M., Fei Qin, and Alberto Brause. 2007. “Does Monitoring Improve Labor 
Standards? Lessons from Nike.” Industrial & Labor Relations Review 61: 3–31. 
Locke, Richard M., Ben A. Rissing, and Timea Pal. 2013. “Complements or Substitutes? 
Private Codes, State Regulation and the Enforcement of Labour Standards in 
Global Supply Chains.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 51 (3): 519–52. 
Locke, Richard M., and Monica Romis. 2007. “Improving Work Conditions in a Global 
Supply Chain.” MIT Sloan Management Review 48: 54. 
  
2 
 
McKay, Steven C. 2006. “Hard Drives and Glass Ceilings - Gender Stratification in 
High-Tech Production.” Gender & Society 20: 207–35. 
Minnich, Dennis, and Frank Maier. 2007. “Responsiveness and Efficiency of Pull-Based 
and Push-Based Planning Systems in the High-Tech Electronics Industry.” 
Nadvi, Khalid, and Gale Raj-Reichert. 2015. “Governing Health and Safety at Lower 
Tiers of the Computer Industry Global Value Chain.” Regulation & Governance 9 
(3): 243–58. doi:10.1111/rego.12079. 
Nadvi, Khalid, and Frank Waltring. 2004. “Making Sense of Global Standards.” In Local 
Enterprises in the Global Economy: Issues of Governance and Upgrading. 
Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Ngai, Pun. 2005. “Global Production, Company Codes of Conduct, and Labor Conditions 
in China: A Case Study of Two Factories.” China Journal 54: 101–13. 
O’Rourke, Dara. 2003. “Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems 
of Labor Standards and Monitoring.” Policy Studies Journal 31: 1–29. 
Piore, Michael, and Charles Sabel. 1984. The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for 
Prosperity. New York: Basic Books. 
Piore, Michael, and Andrew Schrank. 2008. “Toward Managed Flexibility: The Revival 
of Labour Inspection in the Latin World.” International Labour Review 147: 1–
23. 
Pruett, Duncan. 2005. “Looking for a Quick Fix: How Weak Social Auditing Is Keeping 
Workers in Sweatshops.” Clean Clothes Campaign. 
Reich, Robert. 2007. Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy and 
Everyday Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Riisgaard, Lone. 2009. “Global Value Chains, Labor Organization and Private Social 
Standards: Lessons from East African Cut Flower Industries.” World 
Development 37: 326–40. 
Rodriguez-Garavito, Cesar A. 2005. “Global Governance and Labor Rights: Codes of 
Conduct and Anti- Sweatshop Struggles in Global Apparel Factories in Mexico 
and Guatemala.” Politics & Society 33: 203–33. 
Rosenzweig, Phillip. 1994. “International Sourcing in Athletic Footwear: Nike and 
Reebok.” Harvard Business School Case. 
Rossi, Arianna. 2013. “Does Economic Upgrading Lead to Social Upgrading in Global 
Production Networks? Evidence from Morocco.” World Development 46: 223–33. 
Schrank, Andrew. 2006. “Labor Standards and Human Resources: A Natural Experiment 
in an Unlikely Laboratory.” 
Seidman, Gay. 2007. Beyond the Boycott : Labor Rights, Human Rights, and 
Transnational Activism. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Smith, Ted, David Sonnenfeld, and David N. Fellow. 2006. Challenging the Chip : Labor 
Rights and Environmental Justice in the Global Electronics Industry. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Standing, Guy. 2007. “Decent Workplaces, Self-Regulation and CSR: From Puff to 
Stuff.” Working Papers. 
Strasser, Julie B., and Laurie Becklund. 1993. Swoosh: The Unauthorized Story of Nike 
and the Men Who Played There. HarperCollins. 
SwedWatch, SACOM, and SOMO. 2008. “Silenced to Deliver: Mobile Phone 
Manufacturing in China and the Philippines.” 
  
3 
 
Trumbull, Gunnar. 2006. Consumer Capitalism : Politics, Product Markets and Firm 
Strategy in France and Germany. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Trumbull, Gunnar. 2011. “Consumer Credit in Postwar America and France: The 
Political Construction of Economic Interests.” 
Verite. 2004. “Excessive Overtime in Chinese Supplier Factories.” Amherst, MA: Verite. 
Vogel, David. 2005. The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Ward, Julie, Bin Zhang, Shailendra Jain, Chris Fry, Thomas Olavson, Holger Mishal, 
Jason Amaral, et al. 2010. “HP Transforms Product Portfolio Management with 
Operations Research.” Interfaces 40 (1): 17–32. 
Weil, David. 2004. “Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring: Evaluating a New 
Approach to Regulating the Minimum Wage.” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 58 (2): 238–57. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Top Electronics Lead Firms and Contract Manufacturers by Revenue in 
2009  
      
Rank Firm  2009 Revenue   2009 Net Income  2009 Return  Employees 
   (Billions)   (Billions)  On Sales  
Electronics Firms Producing Computer Hardware     
1 Hewlett Packard  $114.5   $7.7  6.7% 304,000 
2 IBM  $95.8   $13.4  14.0% 410,830 
3 Dell  $61.1   $2.4  3.9% 94,300 
4 Apple  $42.9   $8.2  19.1% 34,300 
5 Cisco  $36.1   $6.1  16.9% 65,550 
      
  Total Top 5  $350.4   $37.8  10.8% 908,980  
      
Electronics Contract Manufacturers       
1 Foxconn (Hon Hai)  $67.8   $2.9  4.3% 800,000 
2 Flextronics  $30.9   $(6.1) -19.7% 165,000 
3 Jabil Circuit  $11.7   $(1.1) -9.4% 61,000 
4 Celestica  $6.1   $0.1  0.9% 25,000 
5 Sanmina-SCI  $5.2   $(0.1) -2.6% 31,698 
            
  Total Top 5  $121.7   $(4.4) -3.6% 1,082,698 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Largest Code Violations by Total Audit Percentage 
HP First Tier Suppliers 2004-2008 All Audits* 
 
Major Code 
Violation   
Audits with 
No Violations 
Audits 
with 
Violations 
Total 
Audits 
Percent 
Audits in 
Violation 
Working Hours   204 290 494 59% 
Emergency Preparation   292 193 485 40% 
Hazardous Materials   322 155 477 32% 
Wages & Benefits   337 146 483 30% 
Non-Discrimination   361 109 470 23% 
Occupational Safety   355 102 457 22% 
Occupational Injury   407 63 470 13% 
271 Initial Facility Audits, Follow-On Audits Vary as Above    
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Figure 2: Largest Code Violations by Audit Number 
HP First Tier Suppliers 2004-2008 First-Third Audits* 
 
461-476 Audits: 260-271 First Audits, 126-132 Second Audits, 70-73 Third Audits 
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Figure 3: Working Hour Violations by Geographic Region 
HP First Tier Suppliers 2004-2008 All Audits 
 
 
Percent of 
Total Annual 
HP Spend 
HP Region 
Audits with 
No 
Violations 
Audits with 
Violations 
Total 
Audits 
Percent 
of Audits 
in 
Violation 
75% 
Asia Pacific (Excl. 
China) 63 32 95 34% 
China 48 248 296 84% 
5% Central Europe 46 3 49 6% 
20% Latin America (Spend incl. N. America) 47 10 57 18% 
            
100% Total 204 293 497 59% 
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Figure 4: HP China Supplier Working Hour Study 2008-2009 
Percent Direct Labor Working More than 60 Hours per Week 
 
Source: Hewlett-Packard China Working Hours Pilot Program (13 Plants) 
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Figure 5: U.S. Electronics Market Concentration by Retail Sector 
Major Concentration exists in all sectors except E-Commerce 
 
 
 
Retail Sector Largest Retailer Largest Next 3 Balance 
Consumer Electronics Best Buy 41.5% 20.0% 38.5% 
Computer Stores Best Buy 32.2% 26.9% 40.9% 
Supercenters & Warehouse Clubs Wal-Mart 57.9% 21.8% 20.3% 
Office Supply Staples 36.7% 38.0% 25.3% 
E-Commerce Amazon 15.0% 11.7% 73.3% 
Source: Ibisworld 2010 
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Table 2: Product Market Demand Pressure and Work Organization Selection 
HP First Tier Supplier Facilities Visited—SE Asia 2009 
Company*    Alpha Gamma Epsilon Kappa Lambda Sigma Upsilon 
Location   Thailand Thailand Thailand Singapore Singapore Singapore Malaysia 
Parent HQ  Taiwan US Japan Singapore Canada US US 
Publicly 
Traded  
(Exchange) 
 Yes  (Bangkok) 
Yes  
(NYSE) 
Yes 
 (Tokyo) 
Yes 
 (Singapore) 
Yes  
(NYSE) 
Yes  
(NASDAQ) 
Yes  
(NASDAQ) 
Member 
EICC  No Yes   No No Yes   Yes  Yes  
Product 
  
DC-DC 
Converters 
2.5” & 3.5” 
Internal HDD 
2.5” Internal 
HDD 
Mold Making, 
Injection 
Molding 
Inkjet Cartridge 
Dry/Wet 
Assembly 
Rack Mount 
Servers 
Inkjet  &  
Multi-
Function 
Printers 
Intermediate  
/Final 
Assembly 
  
Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Final Final Final 
 HP as Total 
% Plant 
Production 
  
5% 25% 25% 50% 100% 100% 95% 
Product 
Market  
Demand 
Pressures 
Demand Volatility Low High High Medium Low-Medium Low High 
  Product Mix Low Low Low Medium Low High Low 
  Volume Medium 
High (>8 
million 
units monthly) 
High (~3.8 
million  
units monthly) 
Low 
High (> 7 million  
cartridges 
monthly) 
Low High 
  Buffer Inventories No Yes  Yes No No Build to Order No 
  
HP Use of Price-
Masking 
(as % of Total 
Components) 
Yes (n/a) No or limited  Yes (n/a) No  Yes, (100%)  Yes (~80%) Yes (~80%) 
Work 
Organization 
Selection 
Production Line 
Change  
Requires HP Approval 
n/a  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
  Type of Assembly Conveyor Conveyor Conveyor Cell Conveyor Cell Conveyor 
  Kaizen/Lean Practices Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
1 
 
  
Plant Employees  
2008  
 
8,800 28,000 8,500 570 550 297 12,000 
  Union Company  union 
No, uses  
strategic HR 
None,  
Welfare 
Committee 
Branch of  
National  
Union 
Branch of  
National  
Union 
Branch of  
National  
Union 
No 
  Use of Contract Workers 
Phased out 
2005 
Was 70% until 
2008  
77% of 
employees  
45% of total at 
lower wages 
55% of total at 
lower wages 
 
20-30% of 
total at 
lower wages 
>60% 
  
% of Total 
Employees/ 
Contract Workers that 
are 
Migrant 
less than 5% 
greater than 
50% 
(in-country: 
Isan) 
greater than 50% 
(in-country: Isan) 
45% 
(mainly Malay 
and Chinese) 
~60% (mainly 
Malay) 20-30% 
>50% 
(Bangladeshi, 
Nepali) 
  Women as % of Total Employees 84% 85-90% 85% n/a 85% n/a 55% 
  Working Hours Audit Results 
No 
Violation 2007-Yes 2007-Yes 2007-Yes 2007-Yes 
No 
Violation No Violation 
      2008-Yes 2008-No 2008-No       
  Number of Shifts  Per Day 
2-12 hr. 
(5 days on, 
2 off) 
3-8hr 
(6 days on, 1 
off) 
2-12 hr. 
(5 days on, 2 off) 
2-12 hr. 
(5 days on, 2 
off) 
4-12 hr. 
(4 days on, 3 off) 
3-8hr 
(5 days on, 
2 off) 
2-12hr  
(5 days on, 2 
off) 
Figure 6: Ink Jet Shipments (All Products)—Upsilon Plant 2008-2009 
Average Product Cycle-9 months, 6-8 models 
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